Wednesday, August 19, 2015

New York Prison Problems Continue


Clinton State Prison - Dannemora, NY
(photo Gannett)
New York Post - Aug 2015

Less than two months after a task force of federal, state and local law-enforcement officers searched through the Adirondack Mountains for two escaped murderers from a maximum-security prison in Dannemora, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, or DOCCS, again finds itself with egg on its face — and new revelations suggesting Albany deserves more of the blame for the security breach.

The first piece of bad news for the Clinton Correctional Facility came when Prisoners Legal Services, an inmate advocacy group, filed a complaint on behalf of more than 60 inmates at the prison alleging physical abuse and harsh treatment immediately following the discovery by security staff that two inmates were missing from their cells in the early morning of June 6.

That was when two killers, Richard Matt and David Sweat, dug their way out of the back of their cells, climbed down a catwalk, crawled through a steampipe tunnel and under the wall, coming up through a manhole cover on the streets of Dannemora. The breakout led to a massive three-week manhunt involving over 1,200 law-enforcement personnel.

The inmates filing the complaints of abuse claim that immediately after the escape was discovered they were interrogated, beaten, threatened with waterboarding, unfairly removed from Honor Block and arbitrarily transferred to other prisons throughout the state. During that time, state officials instituted new security policy and procedures to operate a “tighter ship” in the wake of the escape.

The procedures were instituted to “gain control” of a prison run amok. Other actions included the suspension of numerous facility employees, including the facility’s Executive Team, and the arrest of two employees for helping Matt and Sweat carry out their escape plans.

Yet the great escape might have been thwarted if state officials had heeded the warning signs coming from the facility in the months preceding the incident.

In the first half of the year, the prison saw a significant increase in assaults and contraband, including drugs. It culminated in a riot in the yard on May 31 when security staff had to use chemical agents to quell the disturbance. Many of the incidents were believed to be related to the drug trade in the facility and control for turf and money.

The majority of the narcotics were being smuggled in through visitors and packages, but a small percentage was from employees and volunteers.

One week before the escape, prison Superintendent Steve Racette contacted officials in Albany and requested that the facility be put on “lockdown” and searched. Crucially, he also wanted a search of the tunnels and catwalks throughout the facility by the department’s elite Corrections Emergency Response Teams. This request was based on the prior reports that had been forwarded to officials in Albany on the unusual increase in trouble brewing at the facility.

It’s DOCCS policy that no superintendent has the authority to shut down prison operations to conduct security searches. He must request permission from the deputy commissioner for facility operations.

The answer from the deputy commissioner’s office was emphatic: No.

One week later, Matt and Sweat broke out.

The decision to avoid the facility search was a misjudgment based in part to avoid the cost of overtime to conduct the searches. That decision has now cost almost $25 million in overtime for the law-enforcement officers deployed to capture the killers. Additional costs for equipment and repairs to the facility have yet to be calculated.

To this date, the focus on pinning blame for the prison break has centered on Dannemora, not Albany. Yet we know that several department heads had oversight and responsibility for the security procedures that were in place at the time of the escape as well as the placement of Matt and Sweat in the facility’s Honor Block.

To add to the department’s woes, we’re now being told that the FBI is opening an investigation into allegations of corruption and drug trafficking at the Clinton prison. It suggested the feds’ had little confidence in the department’s Narcotics Unit or Internal Affairs investigators to conduct a thorough investigation on their own.

Those units also operate out of Albany as part of the Office of Special Investigations.

The previous director of operations for that office was arrested in January for sexual harassment. The office has been in disarray since and the new department head had only been there a short time when the escape occurred. His previous background was in white collar crimes, not prison operations.

The state’s corrections-related budget — which had saved money when the state reduced the inmate population and closed several facilities, acts that were the direct results of a reduction in crime and modified sentencing laws — will be heavily impacted by the mistakes made by state officials.

The current DOCCS commissioner has never been confirmed by the state Legislature. His title is “acting Commissioner.” He’s been acting for more than two years, since May 2013.

Perhaps it’s time for that act to close and new leadership to be brought in.



Tuesday, July 7, 2015

New York Prison Officials Shift the Blame, Avoid Responsibility

Governor Cuomo, Commissioner Annucci (left) and Superintendent Racette  tour Clinton  State Prison
following the escape of two murderers


Now that New York’s great escape is over, Albany’s engaged in an epic bout of passing the buck.

One week after the capture of prison escapee David Sweat by the heroic effort (and crack shot) of New York State Police Sgt. Jay Cook, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision announced sweeping changes in the security procedures at Clinton Correctional Facility from which inmates Sweat and Richard Matt escaped on June 6.
Now we’re told by Albany officials that they’re instituting new polices such as more random cell searches, the closing of the Honor Block — from which Matt and Sweat escaped, and in which the two never should have been placed from the beginning — increased supervision of staff and more frequent inspections of tunnels and electrical panels.
Plus, they’ve suspended the majority of the facility’s executive team, as well as nine officers, including a lieutenant and a sergeant who were in charge of the facility during the midnight security tour of the prison on the night of the escape.

Matt and Sweat were housed in the Honor Block, in which prisoners are rewarded for good behavior with more freedom of movement, for an extended period of time.
Both were able to break out of the back of their cells and sneak through a series of catwalks and tunnels before surfacing on the streets of Dannemora undetected by the officer on duty in the guard tower overlooking the prison yard.
The escape plot had been in the works for months uninhibited by security staff.
Crucially, prison officials made no mention of how Matt and Sweat came to be in that block or how they both managed to remain in this particular prison facility after the Office of Special Investigations discovered an inappropriate relationship each prisoner had with civilian employee Joyce Mitchell. It was that office that had the authority to transfer one or both of the inmates prior to the escape.
Here’s the key: Allowing them to remain there was not the facility superintendent’s decision.
That decision was made in Albany.
In instituting the new security procedures, the Department of Corrections is attempting to deflect the blame onto the facility administrators when, in fact, the procedures that were in effect when Matt and Sweat escaped were written by the deputy commissioner for facility operations in Albany.

Facility superintendents don’t issue policy; they implement directives issued by headquarters.
Security policy and procedures for the state’s correctional facilities are set by Albany and codified in the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Rules and Regulations.
They cover everything from health care to safety. Security falls under the authority of the deputy commissioner of facility operations.
We’re not told by the Department of Corrections whether the new security procedures will be instituted in the department’s 16 other maximum-security prisons, or just at Clinton. (One of the other such prisons is Five Point Correctional Facility in Romulus, NY, where Sweat was transferred early Sunday morning after his discharge from the Albany Medical Center.)
One would hope that the new measures extend to all the facilities. Otherwise, we’ll probably have to go through another incident like this which has cost the taxpayers of New York millions, put people needlessly at risk and left the entire Department of Corrections with egg on its face.
It may be that certain facility staff were lackadaisical in the performance of their duties and as such should face disciplinary charges.
But if they’re the only ones held accountable, then state officials were successful in shifting the blame to lesser shoulders.
READ ...

LATE BREAKING NEWS -  Superintendent Racette forced to retire or take demotion


Monday, June 15, 2015

Breakdown in Prison Security - The Human Factor

The daring escape of two murderers serving life sentences from a maximum security prison in New York proves the old adage, “A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.”   In this case it was the human factor, a lovelorn female civilian and a seasoned correction officer.
But the responsibility for the escape goes beyond the two low-level employees who were “conned” by the convicts.
The truth is, those low-level prison employees shouldn’t have been able to assist the escapees the way they did without their superiors noticing and putting a stop to it.
Plus, the prisoners should never have been placed in the cells they were, nor should they have been given freedom of movement they were.



If we learned anything from this, it is that anything can be gotten in prison, for a price.  Neither sophisticated electronic security systems nor stone walls and steel bars will  prevent corrupt employees from acts of misconduct.  But ultimate responsibility for lax security lies at the door of prison administrators.....READ MORE
Joyce Mitchell

Monday, June 8, 2015

Thursday, April 23, 2015

Federal Bureau of Prisons Fails to Follow IG Recomendations

In the Shadow of the Prison Walls

Often what happens within the shadows of the prison walls is elusive to the understanding mind.
A recent article by Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Wall Street Journal regarding  Imam Fouad El Bayly and the Federal Bureau of Prisons leaves one aghast at how prison officials make hiring decisions.  That the BOP would select an individual, who has openly called for the death of infidels,  as a spiritual leader of the inmate muslim population nationwide is beyond a logical explanation.
Fouad El Bayly, was the leader of an Islamic Center in Pennsylvania in 2007 when he made a statement regarding killing anyone who would defame
Islam or depart from it's tenets of faith.  At the time of his statement Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who  had been an outspoken critic of radical Islam and the subjugation of women,  was scheduled to speak at the University of Pittsburgh.
Fouad El Bayly
Eight years later we now discover that Mr. Bayly  was recently cleared by the Department of Justice for hiring as a chaplain within the U.S. prison system.
 Ayaan Hirsi Ali described her reaction on hearing this ; "Imagine my surprise when I learned recently that the man who threatened me with death for apostasy is being paid by the U.S. Justice Department to teach Islam in American jails."
She went  to outline her analysis of how something like this could take place. It was a willful  disregard of DOJ guidelines for background checks of potential prison employees prior to allowing them access to inmates.
Ms Ali is correct in her assessment of the potential threat overlooked by Mr. Bayly's new employer.
The failure of the Department of Justice to follow the recommendations of it's own Inspector General ten years earlier lead to the  hiring of Imam El Bayly.
The IG's report in 2004 called for the use of an established eclessiastical body, approved by the FBI,  to be utilized in the certification of Islamic Clergy as well as a thorough background investigation by law enforcement for all potential religious workers.  At that time CAIR, the Council of American Islamic Relations, offered to be that certifying organization but was turned down by the FBI because of security concerns and alleged ties to Hamas.   Now officials at the BOP have either chosen to ignore the security recommendations of the DOJ or have turned a blind eye to Mr. Bayly prior comments regarding how to deal with critics of Islam.
Perhaps it is time once again for a Congressional oversight committee to look into the threat of radical Islamic influences within the prison community.